

# Ex120 Submission

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## Contents

<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>2</b>
Goals .....	2
Risk Ranking/Profile .....	2
Summary of Findings.....	2
Recommendation Summary.....	2
<b>Attack Narrative</b>	<b>2</b>

## **Executive Summary**

### **Goals**

The goal of this exercise was to Uncover remote code execution in a web site.

### **Risk Ranking/Profile**

This risk is critical as this exploit allowed me to inject a program onto the page and access the files that should not be available to myself.

### **Summary of Findings**

I was able to find and access the certification keys of IntermediateCA.txt, RootCA.txt, and Server.txt as well as access the file 'ThisIsTheFileYouAreLookingFor' in the brian/private directory.

### **Recommendation Summary**

The recommendation from this exercise is to use https instead of http.

## **Attack Narrative**

To begin I ran nikto on <http://www.artstailor.com/brian> and through this the directory `/brian/private/` was indicated as being interesting (see figure 1). Opening the web browser I went to [artstailor.com/brian](http://artstailor.com/brian) and clicked on an image while inspecting the source code for the page and identified that the image source was not the same as the url. I injected `raw=true` into the web url and then changed the targeted file to `htpasswd` to get the username and password for the page (see figures 2, 3, and 4). From a google search I found that the password is MD. In order to decrypt it I saved the string into a file and ran it against john the ripper. From this I identified the password to be swordfish (see figure 5).

At this point I was able to gain access to the administrator page using the credentials `brian:swordfish` (see figure 6). In order to proceed forward I copied the `shell.php` into the directory `/var/www/html/`, changed the password for it to one of my design, added `172.24.0.10` to the `allowedIPs` parameter, and removed the deprecated lines of code on lines 119 and 120. To confirm the Laudanum PHP Shell Access was operational I checked `172.24.0.10/shell.php` in the web browser until it was operational (see figures 7, 8, and 9).

Once this the page was complete I turned to Burp Suite and opened its browser. Ensuring that Intercept was on I navigated to <http://www.artstailor.com/brian> and entered the credentials for administrator privileges. Since this page only allows the import of .png files I copied the file `shell.php` into `shell.png` and up-

loaded that onto the website (see figure 10). Once this was intercepted by Burp Suite I changed the filename from shell.png back to shell.php (see figures 11 and 12).

At this point I was now able to go to the directory <http://artstailor.com/brian/imgfiles/shell.php> and access all files on the website which includes the file 'ThisIsTheFileYouAreLookingFor' in the directory `/var/www/html/brian/private` and the IntermediateCA.txt, RootCA.txt, and Server.txt files in the directory `/var/www/html/certs` (see figures 13, 14, 15, and 16).

```

kali@kali:~$ nikto -host http://www.artstailor.com/brian
- Nikto v2.1.6

+-----+
+ Target IP:      217.70.186.38
+ Target Hostname: www.artstailor.com
+ Target Port:    80
+ Start Time:     2021-11-27 16:16:15 (GMT-5)
+-----+

+ Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
+ The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present.
+ The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user agent to protect against some forms of XSS.
+ The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type
+ No CGI Directories found (use '-C all' to force check all possible dirs)
+ Allowed HTTP Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS, HEAD
+ Web Server returns a valid response with junk HTTP methods, this may cause false positives.
+ OSVDB-3092: /brian/private/: This might be interesting...
+ 7889 requests: 0 error(s) and 6 item(s) reported on remote host
+ End Time:       2021-11-27 16:17:00 (GMT-5) (45 seconds)
+-----+

+ 1 host(s) tested

*****
Portions of the server's headers (Apache/2.4.38) are not in
the Nikto 2.1.6 database or are newer than the known string. Would you like
to submit this information (*no server specific data*) to CIRT.net
for a Nikto update (or you may email to sull@circ.net) (y/n)? n

```

Figure 1:




Figure 2:




Figure 3:




Figure 4:





Figure 5:



5  
Figure 6:

```

kali@kali:~/var/www/html
File Actions Edit View Help
GNU nano 5.8 shell.php
// ***** Config entries below *****
// IPs are enterable as individual addresses TODO: add CIDR support
$allowedIPs = array("192.168.1.55", "12.2.2.2", "172.24.0.10");

# format is "username" => "password"
# password is generated using sha1sum as shown below (don't forget the -n, KEVIN!)
# echo -n Password | sha1sum
# users = array("tim" => "didcb45789341639b6ea40049d923bb233762db7");

# ***** No editable content below this line *****

$allowed = 0;
foreach ($allowedIPs as $IP) {
    if ($_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"] == $IP)
        $allowed = 1;
}

if ($allowed == 0) {
    header("HTTP/1.0 404 Not Found");
    die();
}

Help Write Out line 47/411 (11%), col 48/64 ( 75%), char 1987/13601 (14%)
Exit Read File Where Is Replace Cut Paste Execute Justify Location Go To Line Undo Redo Set Mark Copy

```

Figure 7:

The screenshot shows a web browser window with a 'Fatal Error' message in the console. The error message is: 'Function get\_magic\_quotes\_gpc() is deprecated'. The browser's address bar shows '172.24.0.10/shell.php'. The page content is mostly obscured by the error message, but some PHP code is visible in the background.

Figure 8:

The screenshot shows the 'Laudanum Shell' web application. It has a dark header with the title 'Laudanum Shell - Media Prefix'. Below the header is a login form with the following elements:

- A heading: 'Authentication'
- A label: 'Please login:'
- A text input field for 'Username:'
- A text input field for 'Password:'
- A 'Login' button

Below the form, there is a copyright notice: 'Copyright © 2014, Kevin Johnson and the Laudanum team. Updated by Tim Medin. Get the latest version at [audanum.secureideas.net](http://audanum.secureideas.net).'

Figure 9:




Figure 10:




Figure 11:




Figure 12:




Figure 13:

```
$ cat IntermediateCA.txt
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIFyTCCA7ECFBw0+UpJPMdH9EUqznwORFJ9r7YWMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMIGg
MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEQMA4GA1UECAwHRmxcmlkYTEUMBIGAlUEBwwLR2FpbmVz
dm1sbG9xZzARBgNVBAoMcmFydHNOYwlsb3IxFDASBgNVBAsMC0VUZWZlZWVyaW5n
MRswGQYDVQQDBDJ3d3cuYXJ0c3RhaWxvci5jb20xITAfBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWEm9w
cEBhcncRzdGFpbG9yLmNvbTAAIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIPADCCAgoC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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

Figure 14:



```
$ cat RootCA.txt
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

Figure 15:

```
-----
$ cat Server.txt
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

Figure 16: